FROM THE PAGES OF HISTORY by the late Sh. J N Kachroo

FROM THE PAGES OF HISTORY                          by J N Kachroo,

Indo Pak war ……………(iii)

Plebiscite – Its Genesis and Current Status.

The secessionists hold that the Kashmir accession was subject to people’s will and also to the implementation of an UNO resolution.  They claim India has not honoured her promises. On the other hand, critics of Nehru blame him of Idealism.  It would be appropriate to trace the historical march of events in this regard for an impartial, realistic, and logical (devoid of emotions) conclusions. Human memory is short and always needs to be refreshed.

Before proceeding ahead, it would be useful to keep in mind the salient features of the political scene in Kashmir on the eve of India’s Independence.  It can be summed up as follows:

A secular party, the National Conference (N.C) led the freedom struggle by the citizens of J&K against their Hindu Maharaja.  The Congress was closely associated with the N.C and its movement for democratic rights.  The Muslim League, professed champion of Muslims of the sub continent, denounced the secular democratic movement and its connection with the Congress.

The country was in the grip of massive communal riots. There were large scale riots in the Punjab; the western borders of J&K were too fragile to prevent infiltration.  According to an assessment by Prime Minister Nehru, Maharaja Hari Singh’s army would not be able to face any border trouble, the signs of which were increasingly visible, without popular support.  Obviously, the only major group that could help was the N.C under Sheikh Abdullah, who was in jail along with his followers.

The decision of the British Govt. to partition India was announced on 3^rd June 1947 .The rulers of the states could make their own decision.

Maharaja Hari Singh’s Procrastination

The Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten visited Kashmir on 19^th June 1947 to meet Maharaja Hari Singh.  One day before he flew to Srinagar, he issued a statement saying “Constitutionally and legally the Indian states will be independent sovereign states on the termination of paramountcy and they will be free to decide themselves to adopt any course they like”.  His mission was to make Hari Singh realise the gravity of the situation and act decisively.  But, unfortunately, the crucial meeting between them scheduled for 22 June 1947 could not take place.  Hari Singh suffered a colic attack.  Shortly after his return to London Mountbatten said in a speech, “On every one of the four days, I persisted with the advice:  Ascertain the will of your people by any means and join by August 14^th this year…   Had he acceded to Pakistan before 14^th August 1947, the future govt. of India had allowed me to give His Highness an assurance that no objection whatever would be raised by them.  And had the Maharaja joined India, Pakistan could not object, as it did not exist”. (Refer Time Only To Look Forward P.69)”. .The Viceroy returned without any success.

Mahatma Gandhi visited Kashmir on 29^th July 1947 on almost the same mission without any visible success. S.M.Abdullah continued being in jail.  Maharaja Hari Singh, perhaps frightened by Jinnah’s Islam in Pakistan and Nehru’s democracy in India, opted out for procrastination.  S.M.Abdullah, continued to be in jail.

Maharaja Hari Singh opted out for a ‘Standstill’ Agreement with Pakistan.  Theoretically he attained his Independence on 15^th August 1947 on the termination of British paramountcy.

Integration of Indian States

565 Indian states would assume sovereignty on 15^th August 1947.  To deal with the situation a Department of States was constituted and brought under the control of Home Minister, Sardar Patel on 5^th July 1947.  V.P.Menon, a confidant of the Viceroy, became the Secretary of States.  The stated objective of the States Department was to supervise the integration of the Indian States with the emerging Indian Union.  V.P.Menon’s book, “Story of Integration of Indian States” gives interesting, at times thrilling accounts of the integration stories of some States.  Most of the princes signed the Instrument of Accession willingly, some had to be persuaded, and some coerced.  Typical among the reluctant were the Nawab of Bhopal, Dewan of Travancore and Maharaja Han want Singh of Jodhpur.  The last mentioned almost worked out a deal with Jinnah for acceding to adjoining Pakistan, in spite of overwhelming Hindu majority of the state.  All these were persuaded to join India.  However, Hyderabad, Kashmir and Junagarh remained undecided.

Kashmir ignored

No effort was made to persuade, much less to pressurise or coerce Hari Singh to accede to the emerging Indian Union.  Hadson writes in the “Great Divide”.

“The States Ministry of the Govt. of India was meanwhile strictly passive.  Kashmir was deliberately omitted from a committee of States representative called by Pre-Independent States Department to discuss the terms of accession, though Hyderabad was included”.

V.P.Menon writes in his book “The story of Integration of Indian States”….  “We left the State (Kashmir) alone.  We did not ask the Maharaja to accede, though at a time (after partition) as a result of Red-Cliffe Award, the State had become connected by road with India. Owing to the composition of population, the State had its own peculiar problems.  Moreover, our hands were full and, if truth be told, I for one had simply no time to think of Kashmir”.

What does this attitude suggest?

Was India not interested in integrating 3^rd biggest State in spite of its strategic importance?

Was the States Ministry convinced that the composition of its population did not warrant any efforts to persuade the Maharaja to accede to India, in spite of N.C factor?

Whatever it is, the fact remains that no pressure was brought upon Hari Singh to take S.M.Abdullah into confidence to take a decisive step for three weeks from the date of his release till 22^nd October 1947 when Kashmir was raided by tribal’s backed and organised by Pakistan army.

Release of Abdullah – Time Lost

Meanwhile the situation on Kashmir borders worsened. Alarmed by reports, P.M. Nehru, on 27 Sept. 1947 wrote a long and well argued letter to the Minister of States (Spate) saying “I rather doubt if Maharaja and his State forces can meet the situation by themselves without popular help. Obviously only major group that can side with them is the N.C under Sheikh Abdullah’s leadership… we have definitely great asset in N.C…  Sheikh Abdulla has repeatedly given assurance of wishing to cooperate and of being opposed to Pakistan”.

S.M.Abdullah was released on 29 Sept.1947 and on 4^th October he said, “…..I never believed in the Pak slogan…..Pandit Nehru is my best friend and I hold Gandhi ji in real reverence”.

Yet for three weeks between 29 Sept 1947 up to 22 Oct. 1947 when Kashmir was raided by Pak backed armed tribals, nothing was done to put pressure on Hari Singh to take Sheikh Abdullah into confidence and take a firm decision.

However, Sheikh Abdullah, perhaps realising the urgency took a bold step.  He sent a delegation led by G.M.Sadiq to Pakistan with a three point proposal:

   1) Pakistan should not precipitate a decision upon them.

   2) Give them (Kashmir) time and support the freedom movement in   Kashmir and

    3) Recognise the democratic right of the people to decide their future.  Sadiq went to Pakistan twice, without any success.

Even on 31 October 1947 (after accession) Sheikh Abdullah sent a signal of Peace to Pakistan. He said “….I request Mr.Jinnah to accept the democratic principle of the sovereignty of the people of our State, including as it does 78% of Muslims whose free and unhampered choice must count in the matter of final expression” – (Hindustan Times 2 November 1947).

Pakistan with an eye on Hyderabad and Junagarh would not accept it.  Mr.Jinnah is reported to have commented, “Kashmir is in my pocket”.

“Accession to India”

The armed raid on 22 October 1947 precipitated the matter.  Kashmir could not resist the massive raid.  Death and destruction were unleashed.  The state administration almost collapsed.  India could not send any help unless J&K had acceded to India. On 26 October 1947 Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession to India, endorsed by Sheikh Abdullah.  Accepting the accession, the Governor General Mountbatten wrote in a separate letter,

“……In consistence with the policy of the Got…. it is, my governments wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored and soil cleared of the invader, the question of State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people”.

Why had India put a condition when it was not needed under the Independence Act? Explaining the Indian stand and action, Mountbatten speaking to the Editor of Statesman on 28 October 1947 said “You cannot build a nation on tricks …. Jinnah at Abbatabad had been expecting to ride in Triumph into Kashmir… India’s move on Kashmir was an event of different order.  Her readiness to accept a Plebiscite had been stated from the outset. The Maharaja’s accession gave complete legality to the action so far taken.”

It is interesting to note that legality of Kashmir’s accession to India was never questioned by any power in the Security Council.  On 4^th February 1948, the U.S representative in the Security Council said:

“……with the accession of J&K to India, his (Maharaja’s) foreign sovereignty went to India, and that is how India happens to be here as a petitioner”.

Why Conditional?

Was this offer of reference to people’s opinion unique in the case of Kashmir? If not, what was the evolution of this policy? A ‘policy’ should be distinguished from a constitutional provision.  The former is usually a mechanism to deal with an evolving situation and is often subject to modification and amendment to suit the time of its implementation.

The evolution of the policy

A close study of the historical development vis-à-vis the integration will show that;

Most of the states acceded to India on agreed conditions either willingly or as a result of persuasion / negotiation without any such condition for ratification.  In all such cases the ruler exercised his powers of decision conferred upon him after the termination of British paramountcy.  But unfortunately, three States Junagarh, J&K and Hyderabad remained undecided till 15 August 1947 and beyond.

Incidentally all the three had more or less similar problem.  The rulers and the majority of the ruled did not belong to the same religion.

Junagarh presented the first opportunity to the Govt. of India to evolve a policy to deal with the delinquent who did not act judiciously and timely.  Let us examine the sequence of events related to Junagarh:

On 15 August 1947, the Nawab announced his decision to accede to Pakistan.

On 21 August 1947, V.P. Menon, asked Pakistan to clarify her policy, keeping in view that 

                a) Junagargh had no geographical continuity with Pakistan,

                b) The majority of people were Hindus and

                c) Peoples’ consultation was necessary.

On 12 Sept. 1947, Nehru sent a written message to Pakistan through Lord Ismay, Mountbatten’s chief of staff proposing to accept people’s verdict.

On 13 Sept. 1947, Pakistan accepted the accession of Junagarh

India refused to accept the validity of the accession, but Mountbatten regarded it legally valid, though politically and morally incorrect.

On 17 Sept. 1947, India sent V.P. Menon to Junagarh to advise the Nawab to accept the proposal for reference to the people.

Respecting Mountbatten’s views, India resisted the temptation of an armed intervention.

On 25 Sept. 1947, Pak turned down India’s proposal for a referendum, stating “this was a matter between the Nawab and his subjects”.

On Sept 30, 1947, the Prime Minister proposed in the newly constituted Defence Committee, “Wherever there is a dispute in regard to any territory, the matter should be decided by referendum / plebiscite…. We accept the decision whatever may be”. (Hudson – Great Divide)  The decision was immediately conveyed to Pakistan.

Next day Nehru made a public announcement of this decision.

In a meeting of Joint Defence Council attended by Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, Mountbatten said that the decision of the Defence committee of India, referred to above (item no.9) would apply not only to Junagarh but to other areas as well.

Liaquat Ali Khan made no comment.  Was it because of Junagarh and Hyderabad? Or, was it because of Pakistan’s lack of confidence to win in S.M.Abdullah’s Kashmir?

Pakistan chose to insist on the ruler’s prerogatives in the case of Junagarh and Hyderabad.  She maintained her conspicuous silence regarding Kashmir.

After meeting Liaquat Ali Khan on 16 October 1947, Mountbatten reported that Pakistan was agreeable to a plebiscite, but the Pak Prime Minister backed out saying it was a misunderstanding.

India held a plebiscite in Junagarh on 20 Feb. 1948.  Pakistan did not cooperate.

India remained committed to her declared policy which was stated in his letter by the Governor General on 26 Oct 1947 while accepting the accession of J&K.

India’s efforts and Pakistan’s reaction

The Govt. of India showed its seriousness about the commitment right from the start, but unfortunately failed to persuade Pakistan to accept the offer.  The following are some instances;

On Nov. 1, 1947 Mountbatten conveyed to Mr.Jinnah the commitment of the Govt. of India, Mr.Jinnah suggested a Round Table conference of Mountbatten, Nehru, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, and Hari Singh & Sheikh M Abdullah. The last two had no locus standii after accession.

Without prior sanction of the cabinet, Mountbatten suggested to Mr.Jinnah to hold a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nation.  Jinnah rejected it and suggested a plebiscite under and the supervision of Mountbatten and Jinnah himself.

On 2 Nov 1947, Nehru in a broadcast said, “…In Kashmir, India is willing to hold a referendum under some such international authority as that of the United Nations”.  (V.P.Menon says that no Indian Minister objected)

On 25 Nov 1947 speaking in Parliament (reading from a prepared statement, while both Patel and Shyama Prashad Mukherjee were present) Nehru said, “….we have suggested that when the people are given a chance in future, this should be done under the supervision of an impartial tribunal such as the United Nations Organisation”.

A meeting of Nehru and Liaquat was arranged by Mountbatten at 4p.m. on 26 Nov. 1947.  A series of meetings at lower level took place to discuss disengagement. Liaquat Ali Khan returned to Pakistan ahead of his delegation’s departure.  He issued a statement that Pakistan would never give up Kashmir.  Fresh batches of raiders were sent to Kashmir and ghastly atrocities by the raiders were reported... Mountbatten’s effort failed once again...

United Nations Efforts

The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) comprising representatives of Czechoslovakia, Argentina, Belgium and Colombia and the United States, arrived in Karachi on 5 July 1948.   On 9 July 1948 the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sir Zaffarullah Khan informed the commission that three brigades of Pakistani army had been operating in Kashmir.  When the commission arrived in New Delhi, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, and the Secretary General of External Ministry reacted sharply and pleaded that the situation had changed since the commission was formed in April 1948.  “Pakistan should be named an aggressor and condemned”, was the Indian demand.   However, after much negotiation the UNCIP passed a resolution on 13 Aug 1948.  The basic resolution  had three parts;  Part one relates to cease fire;   Part two made it incumbent upon Pakistan to withdraw all forces, regular and irregular, while accepting that India could retain sufficient forces for the security of the state including the observance of law and order.  Part three provided as follows;

“The Govt. of India and Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future of the state of J&K shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people and to that end, upon the acceptance of the Truce Agreement both Governments agree to enter into consultation with the commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured”.

Implications!

Before tracing the events leading to cease fire on 1 January 1949, let us bear in mind the implications of the resolution;

1. Pakistan was an aggressor, 2. It was Pakistan’s responsibility to withdraw the irregulars besides her regular troops. 3.  India had the constitutional and legal right to look after the security of the state, while Pakistan had no locus standii.  4.  The modalities of a reference to the people were subject to the acceptance by the two Govts. And; 5.  That implementation of part three would follow that of the parts one and two.

It may be mentioned that India accepted the resolution only after receiving categorical assurance on 25 Aug 1948 to the effect:

That India would have to maintain sufficient forces in the state to meet the threat of external aggressions as well internal order;

That the sovereignty of the state extended to its entire territory and that there would be no recognition of the so called “Azad Kashmir” ;

That Pakistan did not have any claim to have any part in a plebiscite, should it be decided to seek a solution of the future of the state by means of a plebiscite.

Pakistan sent a formal reply with a “formidable list of objections” aimed at securing absolute equality with India.  The commission was prepared to accept some demands, but Pakistan’s formal reply sent on 6 Sept. 1948 was considered as her rejection.  The commission hoped that Pakistan would reconsider.

Supplementary Proposal

Then started a series of Anglo-Pakistan moves aimed at securing an unconditional cease fire.  The United States opposed it.

On 17 Nov. 1948 Liaquat Ali Khan sought Security Council’s help for an early cease fire.  Meanwhile India secured a written assurance from the UNCIP that she (India) could not be bound by the agreement if Pakistan failed to implement her obligation under 13 August 1948 resolution.

UNCIP also agreed that if the plebiscite administrator found the method of plebiscite impracticable, other methods could be discussed only after 1 & 2 parts of the resolution were implemented to the satisfaction of the UNCIP.    India accepted the supplementary proposals in the light of the assurances on 23 Dec 1948.  The cease fire came into effect from midnight on 1 Jan 1949.

The first part of the resolution was implemented and cease fire came into force. Cease fire line was demarcated.  The second part remains to be implemented yet.  Third part could not be considered.  The stalemate continued. Those who demand the enforcement of U.N. resolution for holding a plebiscite ignore the hurdle in its implementation.

Nehru’s Liberal offer!

In spite of non fulfillment of provisions of the resolution by Pakistan, Nehru, the idealist that he was, made a bold and generous offer to Pakistan within a fortnight of the arrest of S.M.Abdullah on 9 August 1953.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali came to India on an official visit. Nehru suggested;

A plebiscite administrator could be named by April 1954.

Voting could be done in the whole state rather than separate Hindu or Muslim regions and if it meant the loss of the whole valley, he was prepared for it.

The only condition Nehru placed was that the American U.N. nominee Admiral Nimitz be replaced by someone from a smaller country.  The offer was confirmed in a letter to Mohammad Ali on 6 Sept 1953.  Bakshi Ghulam Mohamad, who had succeeded Abdullah as Prime Minister of J&K, threatened to resign.  Nehru calmed him with a letter on 18 Aug 1953 saying; “…we have to choose a path which not only promises the greatest advantage but is dignified with our general policy”.

Pakistan made Admiral Nimitz an issue.  Nehru withdrew the offer as soon as Pakistan announced her military alliance with the United States.  An opportunity was lost.

Ratification of Accession

In 1951, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly (C.A) was convened with a four point objective:

To decide the future of monarchy

To decide about the compensation to land lords.

To decide about the accession of Kashmir.

To frame a Constitution for the State.

Speaking to the elected members of the C.A., Sheikh Abdullah said, “….Today is the day of destiny that comes once in a life time of a nation.  Decide what you want – India, Pakistan or Independence”.  The Constituent Assembly abolished monarchy, gave land to tillers without any compensation to the landlords, confirmed accession of Kashmir to India and passed a Constitution.  The constitution of Kashmir came into force on 26 Jan 1957.  The recommendations of the C.A. had already been incorporated in the Indian Constitution on 14 May 1954 by a Presidential Order.

India holds that the accession of Kashmir is legally and morally a closed chapter.  She does not accept the view that the C.A’s decision is not valid on two accounts; 1. The other decisions of the C.A. have been welcomed, 2.  The agreements with UNCIP envisaged other methods, if holding a

Plebiscite was not possible.  Non co-operation by Pakistan, even in 1953 – 54 made it necessary to close the chapter.

Pakistan’s Priority

Pakistan seemed to have believed in forcible capture of the state.  After Nehru’s death in 1964, Pakistan made a secret plan of taking Kashmir by force.  She sent armed infiltrators into the valley in August 1965.  Pak army backed it.

Nehru informed the parliament in August 1952  “that any further aggression or attack or military operation in regard to Kashmir, if such takes by the other side, that would mean an all out war not only in Kashmir, but elsewhere too”.  Lal Bahadur Shastri implemented this policy in 1965.  The policy has not changed yet.  And 1971 conflict is history.  Pakistan failed to take Kashmir by force.

Conclusion:

The catastrophe that Kashmir has been facing could have been avoided:

if Maharaja Hari Singh had acceded to either Dominion before 15 August 1947;

if Pakistan had considered favourably the proposal of N.C. conveyed by G.M.Sadiq, and later had Mr. Jinnah responded sympathetically to S.M.Abdulah’s” signal of peace of 31^st Oct 1947;

if tribal raid in Oct 1947 had not taken place and forced the Maharaja to accede to India;

if the Pakistan PM had accepted Nehru’s offer made in August/September 1953, even when Pakistan could not implement in toto the August 13 resolution. But perhaps Pakistan believed (may be, still believes) in the use of force and Hari Singh thought of Independence - a reckless thought. .

As already stated the UNCIP was told in Karachi on 9 July 1948 that Pakistan regular army was fighting in Kashmir.  Apart from asking for the condemnation of Pakistan, Sir G.S.Bajpai pointed out, “…. If Pakistan wanted a decision by force, and the decision went against Pakistan, it could not invoke the machinery of the United Nations to obtain what it had failed to secure by its chosen weapon of force”.  (Ref Korbel Joset: Danger in Kashmir Page 124)

The External Affairs Ministry mandarins cannot afford to ignore this prophetic statement.

The need of the hour (2004) is to be a realist and to think a hundred times about the demand of a plebiscite recognising the complexities of the situation as a result of non fulfillment of conditions laid in the Part two of the resolution, and may never be.  Therefore, the present emphasis on finding a solution keeping in view the existing situation.  The aim has to be to ensure peace and progress of the people and the region.

References:

V.P.Menon: The Story of the Integration of Indian States.

Campbell Johnson: A Mission with Mountbatten.

Lt.Gen L.P.Sen: Slender Was The Thread.

P.N.Koul Bamzai – Culture & Political History of Kashmir

C.Dasgupta: War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947 – 48

M.J. Akbar: Kashmir Behind the Vale